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EXTRADITION TREATY IMPROVEMENTS TO
COMBAT DRUG TRAFFICKING
International extradition is the legal process through which one
nation, upon request by another nation, apprehends and delivers
to the requesting nation an individual within its borders who has
been accused or convicted of a crime in the requesting nation.1 On
June 28, 1984, the United States Senate ratified new extradition
treaties with Thailand,2 Costa Rica,3 Jamaica,' and Italy.' These
treaties reflect an increased administrative commitment to sur-
mount obstacles in transnational law enforcement efforts. Specifi-
cally, the revision of antiquated extradition treaties7 is part of a
The concept of extradition can be traced back to the ancient Egyptian, Chaldean, and
Chinese civilizations. M. BASSlOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as M. BASSIOUNI]. These early extraditions were generally ges-
tures of friendship between sovereigns rather than acts resulting from treaties or agree-
ments. The earliest recorded extradition treaty was signed between the Egyptians and the
Hittites about 1280 B.C. This treaty permitted the surrender of a criminal who had violated
the law of one nation and who was found within the other. See Note, The Jaffee Case and
the Use of International Kidnapping as an Alternative to Extradition, 14 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 357 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Jaffee Case]. For in-depth discussions of extradi-
tion procedure in the United States, see Bassiouni, International Extradition in American
Practice and World Public Order, 36 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Bassiouni,
TENN. L. REV.]; Bassiouni, International Extradition: A Summary of the Contemporary
American Practice and a Proposed Formula, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 733 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Bassiouni, WAYNE L. REV.].
2 S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, Extradition Treaty with Thailand, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
1 S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, Extradition Treaty with Costa Rica, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, Extradition Treaty with Jamaica, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
5 S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, Extradition Treaty with Italy, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG.
REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
' See Statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal Divi-
sion United States Department of Justice, Concerning the Senate's Advice and Consent to
the Ratification of Law Enforcement Treaties 3, (June 14, 1984) (Department of Justice
Prepared Statement) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Mark Richard].
The procedures contained in the original extradition treaties were signed in the late
19th and early 20th centuries. Extradition Treaty, Dec. 30, 1922, United States-Siam, 43
Stat. 1749, T.S. No. 681; Extradition Treaty, Nov. 10, 1922, United States-Costa Rica, 43
Stat. 1621, T.S. No. 668; Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931, United States-Great Britain, 47
Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849 (includes Jamaica); Convention Concerning Extradition of
Criminals, June 11, 1884, United States-Italy, 24 Stat. 1001, T.S. No. 192 (original treaty
version at 15 Stat. 629). Although adequate at the date of signing, various defects have
arisen because the treaties were neither replaced nor amended to keep pace with changing
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continuing program to improve the United States' ability to com-
bat international narcotics trafficking.'
Historically, the broad oceans which separate the United States
from most of the world largely insulated it from transnational
criminal activity.9 However, with the advent of modern technology,
ocean barriers no longer provide insulation against such activity.10
Furthermore, improvements in international shipping and air traf-
fic allow drug smuggling to operate on an international scale.11
As marijuana, heroin, and cocaine began flowing into the United
States in steadily increasing amounts since the 1960's, federal offi-
cials recognized that drug trafficking and drug addiction had be-
come one of the most serious social problems in the United
States.12 The increasing drug trafficking problem is illustrated by
examining the number of extradition requests within the last
twenty years. In the 1960's, the total number of extradition re-
quests involving the United States seldom exceeded twenty per
year. 3 By 1978, however, the number reached one hundred.1 4 In
1984, the United States government expected more than four hun-
dred.1 5 Based on past experience, approximately one-third of the
requests would relate to drug trafficking.16 To remedy the drug
social conditions and advancing technology. As a result, many crimes such as aircraft hi-
jacking, computer fraud, and drug trafficking were not listed as extraditable offenses in the
old treaties. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 132 (1971).
8 Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 3. Besides extradition treaties, the devel-
opment of mutual assistance and prisoner transfer treaties will be important in enhancing
international law enforcement cooperation. Id. at 6. Mutual assistance treaties greatly facili-
tate the process of obtaining evidence from abroad providing an arrangement by which na-
tions may cooperate in transfering criminals. Assistance thus becomes mandatory rather
than discretionary. Id. Prisoner transfer treaties will improve international law enforcement
cooperation by improving the ability of the United States to persuade other nations to ex-
tradite their own nationals and by furthering the efforts of United States agents and prose-
cutors in persuading prisoners to provide evidence and testimony against their criminal as-
sociates. Id. at 7-8.
9 Id. at 1-2.
1o Id.
" See generally DiCarlo, U.S. International Narcotics Control Policy in Southeast Asia,
83 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2073, at 46-48 (Feb. 1983).
"1 At the ceremony to announce President Reagan's program for combatting drug traffick-
ing, Attorney General William French Smith remarked that organized crime and drug traf-
ficking represented the most serious problem facing the United States. See Smith, Organ-
ized Crime Today, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 7, 7-9 (1983); see also infra note 43 and
accompanying text (presidential recognition of drug trafficking as a social problem).
" Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 2.
14 Id.
1B Id.
16 Id.
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problem, the Reagan administration has recognized that improve-
ments in law enforcement capabilities are necessary."
This Note examines the problem of drug trafficking and the
need to improve international extradition efforts. This Note then
compares the basic components of the new 1984 extradition trea-
ties with their predecessors. It applies the provisions of the treaties
to the specific problems of drug trafficking and international extra-
dition. Finally, this Note considers whether the treaties will
achieve their stated purposes of aiding the prosecution of narcotics
conspiracies and reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United
States.
I. THE DRUG TRAFFICKING PROBLEM
A. Scope of the Problem
Illegal drugs have been recognized as an international problem
since the thirteen nation Shanghai Opium Commission' s met in
1909 to discuss drug control. As the quality of transportation from
remote areas of the world improved, narcotics began flowing into
the United States from the major drug producing regions of Latin
America,19 Southwest Asia,2" and Southeast Asia.2 1 For example,
improvements in the quality of yachts, fishing trawlers, small in-
ter-island freighters, and light aircraft enable Caribbean smugglers
to deliver directly into canals, inlets, and clandestine airstrips
along the United States Gulf Coast.2  Similarly, the development
7 In October 1982, the Reagan administration published its federal strategy for prevent-
ing drug abuse and drug trafficking. International cooperation is one of the important ele-
ments of the program. See The Federal Strategy, 10 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 10 (Spr. 1983).
" The International Opium Commission met in Shanghai, China, on Feb. 1, 1908, to
study the world-wide opium problem. The meeting was the first international action taken
toward solving the opium problem. See Wright, The International Opium Commission, 3
AM. J. INT'L L. 648 (1909).
" For the purposes of this Note, the term "Latin America" includes the major drug-pro-
ducing nations of the Caribbean, Central America, and South America. These nations in-
clude Bolivia, Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru. See infra notes 25-30 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of drug production in Latin America.
20 Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are the major producers of opium and heroin in South-
west Asia. See infra notes 37-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of drug production
in Southwest Asia.
" Burma, Thailand, and Laos are the primary drug-producing nations in Southeast Asia.
See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of drug production in South-
east Asia.
22 SELECT COMMITrEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL, 98TH CONG., 1ST SEss., REPORT
ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STUDY MISSIONS TO LATIN AMERICA, JAMAICA, HAWAII,
HONG KONG, THAILAND, BURMA, PAKISTAN, TURKEY, AND ITALY 103 (Comm. Print 1984) [here-
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of major international airports in Hong Kong, Singapore, and
Bangkok provide drug traffickers with several modern departure
sites from Southeast Asia. From these cities, opium and heroin can
quickly and easily be delivered to drug traffickers in other
countries.23
Government statistics show that over ninety percent of the ille-
gal drugs consumed in the United States are produced in Latin
America, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia.24 Latin America is
responsible for the majority of the cocaine 25 and eighty percent of
the marijuana imported into the United States. 6 In 1981, these
percentages amounted to approximately forty to fifty metric tons
of cocaine and 8,700 to 12,700 metric tons of marijuana.27 While
Colombia leads all other Latin American nations in the production
of illegal drugs,28 Jamaica has become increasingly important as a
logistical stopover for drug traffickers waiting to enter the United
States.29 Although drug control efforts in Mexico have been rela-
tively successful since the mid-1970's, United States officials be-
lieve that Mexican heroin production is increasing.30
Opium production in Southeast Asia occurs primarily in north-
inafter cited as STUDY MISSIONS].
23 See DiCarlo, supra note 11, at 46-48.
, See The Federal Strategy, supra note 17, at 10.
15 Cocaine is the end product of the leaves of the coca bush. Civilizations on the eastern
curve of the Andes mountains have grown coca for thousands of years. Stopping "Mother
Ships" - A Loophole in Drug Enforcement, 1978: Hearings on S.3437 Before the Subcomm.
to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 85 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Mother Ships).
" See STUDY MISSIONS, supra note 22, at 1.
"7 See International Narcotics Policy: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Nar-
cotics Abuse and Control, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1983) (Narcotics Statistics) [hereinafter
cited as Narcotics Policy Hearings].
" Colombia supplies at least 50% of the United States and world cocaine markets at the
same time. Further, 70% of the marijuana smuggled into the United States comes from
Colombia. Linnemann, International Narcotics Control Strategy, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. No.
2059, at 48 (Feb. 1982).
" The island of Jamaica is extremely important in drug-trafficking operations as a land-
ing and refueling base for aircraft and marine vessels en route to the United States. Id. at
50. The nation also exports marijuana and hashish oil. United States government estimates
show that Jamaican exports to the United States are rising. Marijuana exports increased
from an estimated 900-1,200 metric tons in 1981 to 1,750-2,500 metric tons in 1982. DiCarlo,
Marijuana Production and Control Abroad, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2082, at 72 (Jan. 1984).
" The Mexican poppy crop is increasing as growers are able to avoid government eradica-
tion methods. Id. at 48. The new practice of planting in small scattered plots rather than a
large single plot makes it more difficult for Mexican authorities to eradicate the crop by
herbicide spraying. See STUDY MISSIONS, supra note 22, at 12-13. See also Drug Wars: Mur-
der in Mexico, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 1985, at 25 (article dealing with increases in drug pro-
duction in Mexico).
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ern Thailand, eastern Burma, and western Laos, an area govern-
ment officials refer to as the Golden Triangle.31 The opium growing
area is largely remote, rugged, and inhabited by tribal people who
have grown opium for years as their major cash crop.32 Opium de-
rivatives"3 leave Asia from Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Singapore
via commercial air couriers, air freight, international mail, and
merchant vessels for the United States.34 In 1984, the United
States government estimated that sixteen percent of all heroin im-
ported into the United States originated in Southeast Asia.35 Pre-
dictions are that this figure will increase.36
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, known as the Golden Cresent,
comprise the principal areas for opium and heroin production in
Southwest Asia.3 7 Most of the heroin smuggled into the United
States originates in this region. 38 Government authority to regulate
3' Review of Attorney General's Trip to Asia in Regard to the Narcotics Situation: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Review of Attorney General's
Trip].
31 DiCarlo, supra note 11, at 45. Besides providing a guaranteed cash crop, opium has
historically been used by Southeast Asian hill tribesmen for medicinal purposes. As a result
of this use, opium addiction is common. Southeast Asian Drug Trade: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Southeast Asian Drug Trade].
33 Opium derivatives include morphine and several varieties of heroin. DiCarlo, supra
note 11, at 46. Raw opium is refined to morphine base in jungle laboratories for travel con-
venience. Id. The morphine base can be further refined into Heroin #3 (pit'zu), which is
smoked, or into Heroin #4, which is generally used for intravenous injections. Id.
31 Id. at 47. Although Burma produces most of the opium and heroin, the drugs are easily
exported from Southeast Asia via Thailand because of the long sea coast, extensive river
systems, and large number of fishing boats. Id. From Southeast Asia, trafficking organiza-
tions move the drugs to Hong Kong, Singapore, or Bangkok. See Southeast Asian Drug
Trade, supra note 32, at 23. The most common route from these cities to the mainland
United States is through Tokyo, Manila, or Honolulu to San Francisco and Los Angeles. Id.
Hong Kong has been a major refining and trafficking center for Southeast Asian narcotics
because of its open ports, accessible borders, large addict population, and organized smug-
gling organization. STUDY MISSIONS, supra note 22, at 114. Hong Kong is also the financial
and banking center of the Far East. The nation has few foreign exchange controls and
strictly guards the confidentiality of bank accounts. Id. As a result, Hong Kong has also
become the major financial center for Southeast Asian narcotics trafficking organizations.
Southeast Asian Drug Trade, supra note 32, at 55.
35 In 1982, the Golden Triangle produced between 610 and 720 metric tons of opium,
representing a 100-200 metric ton increase since 1976. See DiCarlo, supra note 11. at 44.
8 Id.
" The 1981 National Narcotics Consumers Intelligence Committee estimated that 54% of
imported heroin originated in Southwest Asia. See Narcotics Policy Hearings, supra note
27, at 65.
38 Linnemann, International Narcotics Control, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2049, at 56 (Apr.
1981).
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drug production is weak in the tribal areas of this region which
have long resisted outside control. 9 As a result, there are no totally
reliable estimates of the amount of illegal drugs produced and ex-
ported from the region. Opium and heroin leave the region by
camel caravan or truck en route to Turkey." From Turkey, narcot-
ics trafficking organizations in Italy continue the drugs on their
route to the United States and Europe.42
The influence of illegal narcotics has been recognized as a serious
social problem in the United States. During the last fifteen years,
each presidential administration has recognized the need to ad-
dress this problem.43 The cost to society is staggering. In 1980, il-
licit drug sales grossed an estimated $79 billion, an increase of
twenty-two percent from 1979.44
Drug trafficking has also led to a significant amount of related
crime. In 1981 Miami, West Palm Beach, and Ft. Lauderdale were
ranked among the United States' top ten crime-ridden cities due to
the influx of narcotics into South Florida .4  Further, to keep their
39 Id.
4" Linnemann, International Narcotics Control Strategy, 82 DEP'T ST. BULL No. 2059, at
48 (Feb. 1982). Members of the House of Representatives Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control were not able to visit Iran or Afghanistan on its fact-finding missions to
drug-producing areas in 1983. See STUDY MIssIoNs, supra note 22, at 176-77. The committee
did report that it believed drug trafficking in Afghanistan has increased since the Soviet
take-over. Id. at 76. The committee also reported that the Iranian government has substan-
tially curtailed opium production. Id. at 77.
" Linnemann, supra note 38, at 50. Opium can be refined into morphine base and heroin
at any point on its journey from Pakistan's frontier to eastern Turkey. These refineries are
not easy to locate and destroy because they are crude and highly mobile. Id.
's Id. Because of its strategic location near Southwest Asian source nations, Italy has been
a transit country for opium and heroin smuggling since the 1920's. Mafia organizations have
been instrumental in shipping heroin to the United States. See STUDY MISSIONS, supra note
22, at 195.
"' The Nixon administration recognized narcotics as an affliction affecting society in the
early 1970's. In his Annual Report to the Congress, President Nixon spoke of the need for
greater international cooperation, stricter law enforcement, and new rehabilitation programs
to fight the problem. PUB. PAPERS, Richard Nixon [75] 335 (1971).
In a message to Congress in 1974, President Ford acknowledged the personal tragedy,
family destruction, and economic waste caused by the illegal flow of drugs into the United
States. Pua. PAPERS, Gerald Ford [34] 849 (1975). In 1982, Ronald Reagan also addressed
the drug-trafficking problem. Like his predecessors, he declared his intent to stop the prob-
lem through stronger law enforcement and international cooperation. PUB. PAPERS, Ronald
Reagan 695 (1982).
" If estimated drug profits are compared with United States corporate profits, the $79
billion drug trafficking profits would rank second in 1980 behind Exxon's $103 billion. The
next closest competition would be Standard Oil of California which grossed $40 billion in
1980. See Drug Traffic Today - Challenge and Response, 9 DRUG ENFORCEMENT 2 (1982).
4 Trouble in Paradise, TIME, Nov. 23, 1981, at 23.
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operations running smoothly, drug traffickers will often bribe for-
eign and United States government officials to ignore drug transac-
tions.4" In 1982, for example, federal sources reported that evi-
dence linked former Bolivian president, General Luis Garcia Mega,
to a drug trafficking operation.4 7 The bribery amounts have be-
come so great that they threaten to destroy the moral, ethical, and
legal responsibilities that are the foundations of law enforcement.' 8
Americans are victimized by drug syndicates49 and dealers carry-
ing out their operations. Drug gangs kill numerous innocent by-
standers by carrying out assassinations in public places. 50 For ex-
ample, in 1982, approximately twenty-five percent of all homicides
in Dade County, Florida, resulted from the use of machine guns
" Smith, supra note 12, at 8. Convicted veteran drug smuggler, Robert Eby, testifying
before a House of Representatives Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation about
narcotics trafficking, had the following to say about bribery of Mexican and other foreign
government officials:
Mr. Eby: If you are a peasant farmer they will spray your field. If you make a
little cash gesture to whoever is in charge of that area, of course, they won't spray
the big field, only the tiny field. The same thing in Colombia and all of South
America. The small man who comes up with say five tons per year is the man who
usually gets hit by the D.A.S. which operates in Colombia. The man who grows a
nine square mile field or whatever doesn't get bothered because he has enough
money to take care of the situation at hand.
Mr. Biaggi: I heard one of the preceding witnesses state that the soldiers help in
the loading and unloading.
Mr. Eby: Yes. It depends. You have to go look at the vastness of the situation.
In some cases you can go down and buy directly from the military forces.
Coast Guard Drug Interdiction: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navi-
gation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49
(1978) (statement of Robert Guy Eby, convicted drug smuggler, Richmond City Jail, Rich-
mond, Va.).
Corruption is so prevalent in Colombia that federal sources report that the mayor of
Santa Marta closes the city airport to commercial flights each night and permits drug traf-
fickers to use it. The mayor is said to personally greet each plane for his money. Coram,
Georgia: America's Marijuana Funnel, ATLANTA MAGAZINE, May 1978, at 77.
"' Maitland, U.S. Said to Prepare Drug Case Against Bolivian, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1982,
§ A, at 8, cols. 3-5. Federal sources allege that a former Bolivian president received millions
of dollars from drug traffickers. Id. Federal sources also claim to have evidence that a for-
mer Bolivian interior minister conspired to ship cocaine to the United States via a fleet of
private planes. Id.
48 Smith, supra note 12, at 9.
4' Id. at 8. The major criminal organization in the United States is the La Cosa Nostra
(LCN). Originating in Italy, the LCN arose in the United States in the early 1930's. Organ-
ized Crime in America: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. 42 (1983) (testimony of William H. Webster, Director, Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion) [hereinafter cited as Organized Crime in America]. The LCN is a confederation of
about 25 families recognizing the authority of a national commission. Id. For an in-depth
analysis of the LCN, see id. at 80.
"o Smith, supra note 12, at 7.
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often associated with drug smuggling.5 1
Traditional drug syndicates are not the only enterprises dealing
in drugs in the United States. Several large motorcyle gangs have
developed throughout the nation.52 They are structured as tradi-
tional crime families and obtain their income primarily from the
sale of drugs.53 Similarly, in the 1960's, prison gangs developed in
California.5 4 These quasi-military gangs are highly structured orga-
nizations whose influence extends beyond prison walls.55
Drugs victimize not only the addict, but also the innocent indi-
viduals robbed, assaulted, and burglarized by addicts in search of
money to sustain their drug habits. 6 The University of Delaware
published a study which showed that 356 active heroin users in
Miami were responsible for 118,134 crimes in one year. 7 A similar
study showed that 243 Baltimore, Maryland, heroin addicts com-
mitted about one half million crimes in eleven years - an average
of 2,000 crimes each, or a crime every other day.5 8
B. United States Response
In the mid-seventies, President Carter pledged his administra-
tion's support in controlling the influx of marijuana, cocaine, and
heroin into the United States through international cooperation
and law enforcement. 59 During his presidency, several committees
traveled to drug-producing regions to examine the drug trafficking
problem. 60 In addition to recommending aid and mutual coopera-
" Id.
52 Id. at 8. The "Big Four" outlaw motorcyle gangs are the Hell's Angels, the Bandidos,
the Outlaws, and the Pagans. Organized Crime in America, supra note 49, at 53.
" Smith, supra note 12, at 8. In some areas, gangs have joined with traditional organized
crime. Organized Crime in America, supra note 49, at 53.
Organized Crime in America, supra note 49, at 54. These gangs include the Mexican
Mafia, La Nuestra Familia, the Aryan Brotherhood, and the Black Guerilla Family. Id.
"' The gangs engage in narcotics trafficking, weapons trafficking, extortion, robbery, and
murder. Id.
" Smith, supra note 12, at 8.
" This study was cited in The Relationship Between the Department of Justice and
State/Local Criminal Justice Communities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
" See International Narcotics Trafficking: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigation of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 69
(1981) [hereinafter cited as International Narcotics Trafficking]. For a detailed explanation
of this study, see id. at 60-72.
59 PUB. PAPERS, Jimmy Carter 1977 II, 1399-1403. In a message to Congress in 1977, Presi-
dent Carter stated that the United States could combat the serious social problem of drug
abuse by subjecting traffickers to swift, certain, and severe punishment. Id. at 1403.
'o In 1976, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations visited Asia. Committee members
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tion, the committees stressed the need for greater commitment by
foreign governments to control the flow of illegal narcotics out of
their countries.61
The Carter administration also recognized that in order to dis-
rupt the drug trafficking routes into the United States, the prose-
cution of fugitive drug smugglers would be required.62 As a result,
President Carter negotiated extradition treaties with several na-
tions to revise and improve outdated extradition treaties.63 The
Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with Turkey,64 for
example, expanded the scope of the previous Turko-American ex-
tradition treaty by adding drug smuggling, bribery, and aircraft hi-
jacking to the list of extraditable offenses. 65 These charges were
designed to contribute to international cooperation in law enforce-
ment with special emphasis on drug-related crimes.66
stated that the fundamental problems in Thailand were non-enforcement of the law against
growing poppies and the quick release of drug traffickers. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON POSTWAR SOUTHEAST ASIA 6 (Comm. Print
1976).
1 Without such foreign commitment, United States efforts will not achieve the desired
results. See Mother Ships, supra note 25, at 66.
United States officials believe that the most successful program to fight narcotics traffick-
ing consists of joint United States and foreign government efforts. The governments of
drug-producing nations must be convinced of the need to become more involved in limiting
production and distribution of narcotics in order to fight the drug trafficking problem. Id. at
72. There are, however, several obstacles. Foreign governments do not have adequate funds
to allocate to narcotics control. Drugs also bring money into the economies of drug-produc-
ing nations. In 1978, it was estimated that drug trafficking brought about $1 billion into
Colombia's economy. Corruption in foreign governments is another obstacle. Id. at 73.
United States drug enforcement agents in Latin America, for example claim that drug traf-
fickers continually bribe Colombian customs officials, judges, and drug enforcement agents.
Id. at 85.
After visiting Latin and South America in 1978, members of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary stated that the key to success in anti-drug programs is greater involvement by
foreign governments in controlling the flow of drugs from their nations. Committee mem-
bers also stated that such success is limited by government corruption and a lack of re-
sources that can be allocated to drug enforcement. Id. at 66.
2 The House of Representatives Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control recognized
that drug smugglers outside United States jurisdiction presented a problem. Criminals not
brought to justice remain involved in drug-trafficking. Narcotics Abuse and Current Fed-
eral and International Narcotics Control Effort: Hearings Before the House Select Comm.
on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 282-83 (1976) (statement of Peter B.
Bensinger, Administrator, DEA, United States Department of Justice).
"' See Extradition Treaty with Turkey, S. EXEc. No. AA, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG.
REC. S22506 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979); Extradition Treaty with Mexico, May 4, 1978, United
States-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656.
64 Id.
66 Id. at (III).
S Id.
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The Reagan administration has continued the attempt to curb
the influx of illegal drugs into the United States. In 1982, United
States Attorney General William French Smith traveled to Japan,
Hong Kong, Thailand, and Pakistan to examine narcotics control
and refugee matters.17 He recommended developing treaties to fa-
cilitate judicial action against drug traffickers and their assets.6 8 In
addition, several members of the House of Representatives Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control traveled to Latin
America, Southwest Asia, and Southeast Asia in 1984 to inspect
the drug trafficking process. The committee then recommended a
program consisting of: (1) monetary aid to foreign governments; (2)
eradication of poppies, coca, and cannabis; (3) development of sub-
stitute cash crops; (4) international cooperation in narcotics en-
forcement; and (5) effective conspiracy laws to combat drug
traffic."'
In recent years, the United States has implemented such recom-
mendations. Extradition treaties, negotiated as a method for prose-
cuting drug traffickers, have been signed with Thailand 7 0 Costa
Rica, 1 Jamaica, 2 and Italy.75 United States authorities are also
working with officials of drug-producing nations to implement crop
substitution programs among farmers.7 4 For example, Jamaican of-
ficials encourage farmers to plant rice and sugar cane and coffee
rather than marijuana .75 The United States is also working with
Thai officials to eliminate the poppy crop by substituting such
67 See Review of Attorney General's Trip, supra note 31, at 4.
6 Id.
" See STUDY MISSIONS, supra note 22, at 105, 141, 150.
70 S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, Extradition Treaty with Thailand, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
71 S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, Extradition Treaty with Costa Rica, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
71 S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, Extradition Treaty with Jamaica, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130
CONG. REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
'3 S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, Extradition Treaty with Italy, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG.
REC. S8573-74 (daily ed. June 28, 1984).
71 Crop substitution programs are not a new idea. United States officials have long recog-
nized the need for crop substitution programs as part of strategy to stop drug trafficking. In
1977, for example, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Narcotic Abuse and
Control stressed the importance of crop substitution programs. Substituting other agricul-
tural crops for poppies would decrease opium production. Southeast Asian Narcotics: Hear-
ing Before the House of Representatives Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1977) (testimony of Robert B. Oaldey, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State) [hereinafter cited as Southeast
Asian Narcotics].
"' STUDY MIssIoNs, supra note 22, at 139.
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crops as kidney beans, upland rice, millet, maize, and ginger root.7"
Although the United States continually gives large amounts of
monetary aid to foreign nations77 to combat drug production, the
volume of illicit drugs entering the United States continues to in-
crease. Marijuana exports from Jamaica rose from 900-1200 metric
tons in 1981 to 1,750-2,500 metric tons in 1983,78 and to an esti-
mated 1,627-2,977 metric tons in 1984.11 In the same period, Latin
and South American cocaine exports rose by 7,800 metric tons.80
Further, the volume of opium from Thailand similarly increased by
ten metric tons.81
Twenty years after drug abuse and drug trafficking became rec-
ognized as a serious social problem, virtually every strategy of con-
trol has failed.8 2 Several factors explain the failure of programs
designed to combat drug trafficking. A successful program requires
the cooperation of both the United States and the major drug-pro-
ducing nations. While the United States government has commit-
ted itself to stopping the flow of drugs into its borders, foreign gov-
ernments have not made a similar commitment.83
Minimal foreign government efforts to curtail the flow of illegal
drugs generally stem from severe shortages of manpower, equip-
ment, and operating funds in the drug-producing nations.84 The
Thai and Burmese governments, for example, have not been able
76 Id.
77 This chart shows the State Department annual financial requests for drug control.
STATE DEPT. FIScAL YEAR ASSISTANCE REQUEST FOR NARcOTICS CONTROL
1983 1984 1985
Latin America $17.0 million $30.0 million $29.4 million
S.E. Asia $ 7.6 million $ 8.9 million $ 8.1 million
S.W. Asia $ 3.95 million $ 4.7 million $ 3.0 million
TOTAL $28.25 million $43.6 million $38.5 million
Taylor, FY 1985 Assistance Request for Narcotics Control, 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 2086, 72-
73 (May 1984).
78 DiCarlo, supra note 29, at 71.
7 Brinkley, Drug Crops Are Up In Export Nations, State Department Says, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at 6, col. 1.
" Latin and South America exported 5,000 metric tons in 1981. This amount rose to
12,800 metric tons in 1983. Taylor, supra note 77, at 72.
' The volume of Thai opium increased from 40 metric tons in 1980 to 50 metric tons in
1982. DiCarlo, supra note 11, at 44.
" Brinkley, Rampant Drug Abuse Brings Call for Move Against Source Nations, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 9, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
'3 See generally supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (United States attempts and
recommendations to curb drug-trafficking).
Brinkley, supra note 82, at 12, col. 2.
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to implement a strong anti-drug policy because they are allocating
most available resources to fighting various insurgent groups.S  In
Jamaica, little can be done to stop narcotics trafficking because of
insufficient manpower and resources. The Jamaican Constabulary
Force's narcotics division, for example, had only twenty-eight men
in 1981 to patrol the island.86
Thailand, Jamaica, Peru, and Colombia are hesitant to destroy
poppies, cannabis, and coca because so many farmers depend upon
these crops for their livelihood.8 7 For instance, marijuana produc-
tion in Columbia's Guajira peninsula provides a livelihood for an
estimated 19,000 families, due in part because marijuana field
workers can earn approximately $7.50 per hour compared to
" Drug trafficking in Southeast Asia is primarily controlled by three insurgent groups
based in the remote hill areas along the Thai-Burmese border. The Chinese Irregular Forces
(CIF), Shan United Army (SUA), and the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) are well-armed
military groups which use drug profits to finance their operations. See Southeast Asian
Drug Trade, supra note 32, at 8-9, 12.
The oldest group in Southeast Asia is the CIF which dominated the Golden Triangle nar-
cotics trade from the 1950's to 1975. This group of about 10,000 represents the remnants of
Nationalist Chinese groups which retreated into Southeast Asia following the Communist
take-over in China. Id. at 8-9.
After the Burmese government's military attack against CIF operations in 1975, the Shan
United Army became the dominant narcotics organization in Southeast Asia. The Thailand-
based SUA cultivates the image of a bastion against BCP advances into Thailand. Id. SUA
existence depends upon revenues from narcotics trafficking and other illegal enterprises for
its existence. Id. at 16.
In 1978, the Burmese Communist Party entered the narcotics trade when China reduced
its support of the insurgency. Like the CIF and the SUA, the BCP has established poppy
cultivation and opium refining to pay troops and to purchase weapons. See id. at 8, 12, 16.
" International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 58, at 164. Insufficient resources are
also a problem in the Jamaican Defense Force. In 1981 Jamaica had no radar facilities. Thus
it was virtually impossible to detect the numerous narcotics flights from clandestine air-
strips. Id. Furthermore, Jamaican chaser plane and Coast Guard capabilities are minimal.
Id.
87 See id. at 135.
To satisfy the market demands of various insurgent groups, many farmers in northern
Thailand produce opium as their major cash crop. Southeast Asian Drug Trade, supra note
32, at 12. Thai and United Nations officials have introduced substitute cash crops such as
rice, kidney beans, maize, and coffee into the region. STUDY MISSIONS, supra note 22, at 139.
These crops, however, have not achieved great success because of a lack of interest and low
market prices. Southeast Asian Drug Trade, supra note 32, at 12.
Andean civilizations have chewed and used the leaves of the coca bush in religious cere-
monies for about 3,000 years. Chewing coca leaves relieves hunger, fatigue, and cold. In most
of the Peruvian and Bolivian Andes, coca is the only source of income. See Mother Ships,
supra note 25, at 75. In Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley, coca is the primary source of income
for over 7,000 farmers. Coca trafficking generates an estimated 60% of the region's economy.
Narcotics Policy Hearings, supra note 27, at 47.
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roughly $3.50 per hour for other agricultural work.88 A Jamaican
poll found that 61.8 percent of the Jamaican population did not
want to reduce marijuana exports to the United States.8 9 Further-
more, other agricultural crops cannot match the income from the
sale of narcotic crops.90 Jamaica, for example, annually earns twice
as much income from marijuana exports than from all other
exports.91
Crop substitution programs generally have not been successful.
The United States and the United Nations have spent large
amounts of money to establish crop substitution programs in Thai-
land."2 In 1984, however, there was a thirty-eight percent increase
in poppy production over 1983.13 Crop substitution programs have
not been enthusiastically received because narcotics-derived dol-
lars help the economies of drug-producing nations and provide in-
Narcotics Policy Hearings, supra note 27, at 42.
89 This public opinion poll shows that a majority of Jamaicans favor the marijuana trade.
See Stone, Majority Opposed to Cutting Back Marijuana Trade, The Star (Jamaican
newspaper) (reprinted in International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 58, at 496).
" Rampant Drug Abuse Brings Call for Move Against Source Nations, N.Y. Times, Sept.
9, 1984, at § A, at 1, col. 12 [hereinafter cited as Rampant Drug Abuse]. Besides being
profitable and easy to grow, marijuana traditionally has been used by Jamaicans for several
hundred years for smoking, tea, and other products. International Narcotics Trafficking,
supra note 58, at 163. Members of the Jamaican Rastafarrian cult and Ethiopian Zron Cop-
tic Church use the drug in their religious ceremonies. Id. at 555.
" Treaster, Jamaica, Close U.S. Ally Does Little to Halt Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10,
1984, at § A, at 12, col. 1. In 1983, Jamaica received $1.4 billion from exports of marijuana.
Id. In recent years the marijuana trade has replaced tourism as the major supplier of dollars
for Jamaica's foreign currency reserves. International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 58,
at 56.
Jamaican government officials are also reluctant to destroy marijuana because they fear a
repeat of the 1979 sugar cane crop burning instigated by drug traffickers in response to the
government's marijuana crop destruction. STUDY MISSIONS, supra note 22, at 107. The pre-
sent Jamaican government also fears the potential backlash from political opponents if it
undertook a major marijuana eradication program. International Narcotics Trafficking,
supra note 58, at 164.
The United States also fears the effects of pressuring the Jamaican government to take
greater initiative. In the last several years, Jamaica has become a close ally. At the same
time, however, Jamaican marijuana and cocaine exports have been increasing. United States
pressure could result in a return in Jamaica of a leftist government, which is perceived by
the United States as a greater national threat than drug trafficking. Rampant Drug Abuse,
supra note 90, at col. 2. See also International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 58, at 164.
92 International Narcotics Trafficking, supra note 58, at 56. The United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture has been funding programs in Thailand since 1973. Id. The United
Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) contributed $2.4 million for five years.
Id.
9 Brinkley, In the Drug War, Battles Won and Lost, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1984, § A, at
16, col. 1-2.
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come for farmers.9 4
Source nations cannot effectively deal with the illegal flow of
drugs. Therefore, the United States has assumed most of the bur-
den of attempting to stop drug traffickers. One method to help
achieve this goal is to improve the effectiveness of the United
States' international law enforcement efforts by revising outdated
international extradition procedures.9 5
II. PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
To increase the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts, im-
provements must be made in obtaining the extradition of traffick-
ers who ship drugs into the United States. Such extradition will
enhance the government's ability to prosecute crimes committed
outside the United States which affect the United States.9"
In the United States, the federal government has the sole power
to regulate international extradition. 97 Like most common law na-
tions, the United States does not allow extradition in the absence
of a treaty." This philosophy is consistent with the established in-
ternational legal principle that nations have no obligations to ex-
tradite absent a treaty.99
The first United States extradition treaty was signed in 1794 be-
tween the United States and Great Britain. Known as the Jay
Treaty, 100 it allowed extradition for two crimes: murder and for-
gery. While the Circuit Court of Virginia stated in 1835 that extra-
4 For instance, illegal drug receipts annually add $1 billion to the Colombian economy.
See Mother Ships, supra note 25, at 73. The State Department estimates that $150 million
from marijuana exports entered the Jamaican economy in 1982. See Narcotics Policy Hear-
ings, supra note 27, at 42.
" See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 3; See also S. EXEc. REF. No. 29, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984); S. Exac. REP. No. 30, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984); S. ExEc. REP.
No. 31, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984); S. TREATY Doc. 33, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984).
" Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 4; See also s. Exac. REPs. Nos. 29-33,
supra note 95.
' Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540 (1840); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 408
(1886). Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); See also 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (1944).
98 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1982) (list of United States extradition treaties). Civil law nations,
however, generally permit extradition without a treaty. For convenience, these nations enter
treaties only with those nations which will not extradite in absence of a treaty. SHEARER,
supra note 7, at 28-31.
See generally Collins, Traffic in the Traffickers: Extradition and the Controlled Sub-
stances Import and Export Act of 1970, 83 YALE L. J. 706, 714 (1974).
I" Jay Treaty, Nov. 19, 1794, United States-Great Britain, art. 27, 8 Stat. 116 (1795), T.S.
No. 105.
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dition is a right that cannot exist absent a treaty, 1 the first fed-
eral enactment on the subject did not occur until 1848.102 The Act
of August 12, 1848, instituted a procedure for the apprehension
and deliverance of offenders in cases where extradition treaties ex-
isted between the United States and foreign governments.0 s Later,
in 1933, the Supreme Court construed the United States Constitu-
tion to require an applicable treaty or federal enactment before the
federal government may seize a fugitive and surrender him to a
demanding nation."0 4 Thus, the extradition treaty became the es-
tablished solution for obtaining jurisdiction over fugitive
criminals. 10 5 By 1983 the United States was a party to bilateral ex-
tradition treaties with ninety-nine nations. 0 6
A typical extradition request by the United States begins with
an application for extradition to the United States Secretary of
State.10 7 The application must state that the person sought is
guilty of one of the offenses covered by the extradition treaty and
that the fugitive is in the asylum nation. 08 The Secretary of State
then has the discretion to decide whether the case is one calling for
extradition of the fugitive to the United States. 10 9
A typical extradition request by a foreign nation begins with
that government filing a verified complaint with a United States
extradition magistrate.110 After issuing a warrant for the fugitive's
arrest and detention, the magistrate conducts a hearing to deter-
101 Ex parte Dos Santos, 7 F. Cas. 949 (C.C.D. Va. 1835) (No. 4,016).
12 Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, 9 Stat. 303 (1848).
103 Id.
Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). The Supreme Court stated that a nation
has no international legal right for extradition in the absence of a treaty. The court ruled
that although a moral duty to extradite may exist, the legal right exists only when created
by a treaty. Id. at 287.
100 See Collins, supra note 99, at 711.
'" For a list, see M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND
PRACTICE, at Booklet B, Tables of Current U.S. Extradition Treaties, 1-11 (1983).
107 If the alleged offense is within the jurisdiction of the state or territorial courts, the
application must come from the governor of such a state or territory. If the offense is a
violation of federal law, it must come from the Attorney General of the United States. See
BASSIOUNI, WAYNE L. REV., supra note 1, at 737-38.
108 Id. at 738.
100 Id. at 739. The Secretary of State exercises considerable discretion in performing this
responsibility. The Secretary must examine the case to determine if all extradition treaty
requirements have been fulfilled. He will then consider such aspects as equity in the case
and international consequences. For an in-depth analysis of the executive discretion privi-
lege see Note: Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313 (1962).
110 The extradition magistrate may be a federal judge, a state judge, or a United States
Commissioner. See BASSlOUNI, WAYNE L. REV., supra note 1, at 737.
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mine whether the demanding nation has sufficent grounds for re-
questing extradition."1 If the evidence is found sufficient, the case
is then turned over to the Secretary of State, who may issue a war-
rant of surrender upon requisition by the demanding nation.' 12
Traditional extradition methods have often proven ineffective.
Although the United States has negotiated extradition treaties
with many nations, most of these treaties have not been revised
since the original versions were enacted. For example, until 1984,
extradition treaties with Thailand, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Italy
had remained unchanged for over fifty years." 3 These early extra-
dition treaties, however, did not anticipate the development of
crimes such as computer fraud, drug trafficking, airplane hijacking,
and credit card fraud."' Since extradition is permitted only for
crimes specified in the treaties, it was very difficult to control and
prosecute crimes such as drug trafficking or computer fraud be-
cause these were new crimes not included in older extradition
treaties. 611
Another problem with international extradition is the double
criminality principle. This principle requires that the conduct com-
plained of be criminal under the laws of both nations."6 Double
criminality is, in effect, a reciprocity requirement intended to as-
sure each nation that it can rely on corresponding treatment. It
also ensures that a nation will not surrender an individual for con-
duct which it does not characterize as criminal." 7
When a court restricts its inquiry in an extradition case to the
label of the criminal charge, extradition will be allowed only when
the specific crime is stated in the laws of both nations." 8 A classic
example of this problem occurred in 1949 when the governor of
Alabama requested the extradition of Henry and Eleanor Dunster
111 Id.
112 Id.
M' See supra note 7 (lists of extraditable crimes in the extradition treaties). Similarly, in
1979, the United States amended extradition treaties with Turkey and Mexico that were
signed in 1902 and 1923, respectively. Extradition Treaty with Turkey, S. EXEc. No. AA,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 125 CONG. REc. S22,506 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1979). Extradition Treaty
with Mexico, May 4, 1978, United States-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 5059, T.IA.S. No. 9656.
114 See SHEARER, supra note 7, at 132.
"' Id. at 134.
16 See M. BAssloUNI, supra note 106, at VII, 3-3 (1983).
"' This principle is still pertinent even though there is a trend toward uniformity of
criminal laws. Sharp variations are found among laws relating to such matters as abortions,
euthanasia, and homosexuality. See SHEARER, supra note 7, at 138.
.. See Collins, supra note 99, at 735.
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from Great Britain.119 The Dunsters had aided their daughter in
unlawfully taking her children from Alabama to Great Britain
against the wishes of her husband. The act was characterized as
kidnapping in the United States. British law, however, did not con-
sider such an act to be kidnapping. As a result, extradition was
denied.120
Governments may circumvent traditional extradition procedures
to gain custody of individuals because of the frustration, time, and
cost associated with the process.12 1 Such circumvention is referred
to as an "extraordinary apprehension." Extraordinary apprehen-
sion is carried out by abduction and irregular rendition. Abduction
is the unilateral seizure of a fugitive by agents of the apprehending
nation without the cooperation of the government of the nation in
which the fugitive is located. 22 Irregular rendition is seizure
through ad hoc agreements, cooperation, or aquiescence by the
other government.12
The United States' position on extraordinary apprehensions dif-
fers as to abductions and irregular renditions. In United States v.
Toscanino,124 the Second Circuit held that United States courts
have no jurisdiction over a person seized through abduction. This
decision is consistent with the traditional notion that abduction vi-
olates customary international law.12 5 Generally, customary inter-
'" This situation is discussed in 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST O INTERNATIONAL LAW 776-77
(1968).
120 Id. Not all nations adhere to such a strict approach requiring the crimes to be the
same in both nations. A less restrictive view ignores the label, and inquires into the criminal
conduct and type of crime. In Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1921), the court stated that
the name of the crime does not have to be the same in both countries. It is enough if the
particular act is criminal in both jurisidctions. Id. at 312. Similarly, in 1959 the Second
Circuit held that it is immaterial if the acts in question constitute the crime of theft and
fraud in Canada, and the crime of larceny in the United States. It is enough if the particular
acts are criminal in both jurisdictions. United States v. Stockinger, 269 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.
1959).
121 See M. BASSlOUNI, supra note 1, at 123.
122 Abramovsky and Eagle, U.S. Policy in Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Ex-
tradition, Abduction, or Irregular Rendition, 57 OR. L. REv. 51, 52 (1977-78). For an in-
depth discussion of abduction, see Jaffee Case, supra note 1.
12M Abramovsky and Eagle, supra note 122, at 51-52. See Jaffee Case, supra note 1, at 368.
124 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974). In 1974, United States government officials kidnapped
Uruguayan citizen Toscanino to face drug trafficking charges in the United States. At the
same time, the United States-Uruguayan extradition treaty did not list narcotics violations
as extraditable offenses. The federal court held that as a matter of fundamental fairness, the
United States government should be obligated to return Toscanino. Id. at 271-75.
'2 Abductions by one nation of a person located within the territory of another violate
the territorial sovereignty of the second nation and are redressable usually by the return of
the person kidnapped. Id. at 278.
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national law governs where a federal statute or judicial decision
does not provide otherwise.12 6 Because no such statute exists, the
United States must rely on customary international law. The prac-
tice, therefore, violates international legal principles. 27
The Toscanino court also held that irregular renditions are ille-
gal if the defendant can prove that United States agents have en-
gaged in reprehensible conduct which deprived him of due process
of law.' " Because international law has not proscribed irregular
renditions as it has abductions, 29 the language in the Toscanino
opinion suggests the notion that those irregular renditions where a
nation does not engage in reprehensible conduct depriving a defen-
dant of due process would be in accord with international law.13 0
In 1975, one year after the Toscanino decision, the Second Cir-
cuit stated in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler'5 ' that an
abduction from another country violates international law only
when the offended state objects to the conduct. Following a com-
ment in the Harvard Research in International Law Draft Extradi-
tion Treaty,'3 2 the Lujan court stated that every irregularity in re-
covering a fugitive is not a violation of international law. 133 If the
'" The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
,,7 Abramovsky and Eagle, supra note 122, at 64.
" 500 F.2d at 275
When an accused is kidnapped and forcibly brought within the jurisdiction of
the United States, the court's acquisition of power over his person represents the
fruits of the government's exploitation of its own misconduct. Having unlawfully
seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable
. . . seizures," the government should, as a matter of fundamental fairness, be
obligated to return him to his status quo ante.
Id. See also United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1970). In Edmons, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that illegal renditions have been seriously questioned
because they condone illegal police conduct. Id. at 583; Government of Virgin Islands v.
Oritz, 427 F.2d 1043, 1045 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970).
" A nation's consent or acquiescence to an irregular rendition waives any international
right it possessed against the offender, and thus precludes any violation of international law.
United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1001 (1975). This principle has been expressed by various commentators. See Harvard Re-
search Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 631 (Supp. 1935); 1 G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 162 (4th ed. 1960).
13 See Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 276. See also supra note 129 and accompanying text.
" See Lujan, 510 F.2d at 68. See also Abramovsky and Eagle, supra note 120.
13 This draft treaty is reprinted in 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 631 (Supp. 1935). The Research in
International Law was organized by the faculty of Harvard Law School in 1927 and 1928 to
prepare a draft of an international convention on several topics. Id. at 1. The law of extradi-
tion was one of the subjects examined.
13 Lujan, 510 F.2d at 67.
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state in which the fugitive is found acquiesces or agrees even in the
most informal manner, there is no element of illegality." 4 United
States law thus allows abductions and irregular renditions in spe-
cific situations.
Resort to such practices, however, causes problems. The Charter
of the Organization of American States, of which the United States
is a member, states:
The territory of a state is inviolable; it may not be the object,
even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures, of
force taken by another state, directly or indirectly, on any
grounds whatsoever. No territorial acquisitions or special advan-
tages obtained by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized. "
The forceful abduction of an individual can thus be viewed as a
violation of the Charter of the Organization of American States be-
cause it violates national sovereignty and territorial integrity.13 6
Irregular renditions also suggest illegality because they fall
outside the traditional extradition process.13 7 Because such seizures
do not provide a hearing to determine whether the evidence justi-
fies removal,138 irregular renditions may also constitute a violation
of the fourth amendment which forbids the an illegal seizure and
arrest of an individual.3 9
The new extradition treaties ratified in 1984140 significantly im-
prove United States efforts to obtain fugitives through extradition.
Substantive and procedural improvements in the extradition pro-
cedure are part of a concerted United States policy designed to
revise and improve the effectiveness of international law enforce-
ment efforts. "1 These treaties will allow the United States to avoid
having to resort to abductions and irregular renditions by eliminat-
ing the defects present in earlier, outdated treaties. At the same
134 Id.
"' Charter of the Organization of American States, opened for signature Apr. 30, 1948,
art. 17, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951).
136 Abramovsky and Eagle, supra note 122, at 92.
137 Id.
138 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
"' The Toscanino Court held that an illegal arrest constitutes a seizure of the person in
violation of the fourth amendment. 500 F.2d at 275. See also Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 100-01 (1959), where the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the philosophy
embodied in the Fourth Amendment against illegal arrests.
140 See supra notes 2-5.
Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 3.
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time, the treaty changes will facilitate government efforts to prose-
cute drug traffickers and combat the flow of drugs into the United
States.142
III. NEW EXTRADITION TREATIES DESIGNED TO STOP DRUG
TRAFFICKING AND IMPROvE EXTRADITION PROCESS
The 1984 extradition treaties are the most recent attempts by
the United States to revise and improve extradition procedures. 1
3
The purposes of the treaties are tri-fold. First, they will provide a
more flexible formula for defining an extraditable offense.14 4 This
substantive change will obviate the need to renegotiate or supple-
ment a treaty should both nations pass laws dealing with a new
type of criminal activity. 45 It will also allow extradition for crimes
presently not included in existing extradition treaties.1 46 Second,
the treaties will facilitate United States efforts to prosecute narcot-
ics conspiracies by expressly providing that conspiracies and at-
tempts to commit offenses constitute extraditable offenses."" Fi-
nally, the new treaties will provide procedural changes which
better accommodate international law enforcement efforts.1
48
A. Substantive Changes
1. Defining Extraditable Offense
The first substantive change in the treaties concerns the method
142 See S. ExEc. REPs., supra note 95.
,11 In 1970, the Department of State began evaluating United States extradition treaties
with the intention of renegotiating or reviewing older treaties which did not provide for
contemporary offenses such as aircraft hijacking and narcotics trafficking. Evans, Legal Ba-
ses of Extradition in the United States, 16 N.Y.L.J. 525, 549 (1970).
144 See S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, at 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, at
3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, at 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5, at 3; S.
ExEc. REP. No. 29, supra note 95, at 1; S. Exsc. REP. No. 30, supra note 95, at 1; S. ExEc.
REP. No. 31, supra note 95, at 1; S. ExEc. REP. No. 33, supra note 95, at 1.
145 Id.
148 Nations adhering to treaties listing specific crimes are limited to seeking extradition
for only those crimes. SHARER, supra note 7, at 134. Early extradition treaties did not in-
clude major crimes such as drug trafficking and aircraft hijacking. See supra note 7.
141 Statement of Daniel McGovern, Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Department of
State, Concerning the Senate's Advice and Consent to the Ratification of Law Enforcement
Treaties, 2-3 (June 14, 1984) (Dept. of State Prepared Statement) [hereinafter cited as
Statement of Daniel McGovern]. See also S. ExEc. REP. No. 29, supra note 95, at 2; S. ExEc.
REP. No. 30, supra note 95, at 2; S. EXEC. REP. No. 31, supra note 95 at 2; S. EXEc. REP. No.
32, supra note 95, at 2.
348 Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 3; see also S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra
note 2, at 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, at 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4,
at 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5, at 3.
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for defining an extraditable offense. The generally adopted practice
is to list specifically all of the offenses for which extradition will be
allowed. 149
The United States has continually used such a method of enu-
meration since its first extradition treaty in 1794.150 The primary
defect with this method is the inadequate range of offenses covered
by the treaties.15' Because nations adhering to treaties listing spe-
cific crimes may seek extradition for only those crimes, they can
not extradite a criminal who has committed an unlisted crime.L52
This problem occurred in United States v. Toscanino, where the
United States government was held to have unlawfully kidnapped
a Uruguayan citizen because the extradition treaty between the
United States and Uruguay did not include narcotics violations.' 53
To remedy this substantive defect, the 1984 extradition treaties
define an extraditable offense as one punishable under the laws of
both nations by imprisonment for more than one year. 54 By avoid-
ing lists of extraditable crimes, the eliminative method' 5 will dis-
149 This practice became the standard international form in the late 19th century.
SHEARER, supra note 7, at 133.
'" Jay Treaty, supra note 100; see also supra note 7.
In 1939, Secretary of State Hull commented upon the possibility of adopting a minimum-
penalty provision rather than a list of offenses by stating that "all the bilateral extradition
agreements of the United States contain lists of extraditable crimes and the State Depart-
ment does not desire to make any exceptions to this practice." 6 WHrrEMAN, supra note 119,
at 733.
... Statement of Daniel McGovern, supra note 146, at 2; see also S. EXEC. REP. No. 29,
supra note 95, at 2; S. EXEC. RE. No. 30, supra note 95, at 2; S. EXEc. REP. No. 31, supra
note 95, at 2; S. ExEc. REP. No. 33, supra note 95, at 2.
152 SHEARER, supra note 7, at 134.
"53 Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 275-77.
4 The extradition treaty with Thailand states:
An offense shall be an extraditable offense for prosecution or for the imposition
of a penalty or detention order only if it is punishable under the law of both
contracting parties by imprisonment or other forms of detention for a period of
more than one year or by any greater punishment.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, at 2, para. 2, at (1).
The treaty with Costa Rica describes an extraditable offense as one "punishable under the
laws of both contracting parties by deprivation of liberty for a maximum period of more
than one year or by any greater punishment." S. TRATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, art. 2,
para. 2, at (1). Similarly, the Jamaican treaty defines an offense as extraditable "if it is
punishable under the laws of both contracting parties by imprisonment or other form of
detention for a period of more than one year or by any greater punishment." S. TREATY Doc.
No. 18, supra note 4, art. 2, para. 2, at (1). An extraditable offense is defined in the treaty
between the United States and Italy as one "punishable under the laws of both contracting
parties by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one year or by a more severe
penalty." S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5, art. 2, para. 2, at (1).
"I The eliminative method does not list specific extraditable crimes. Rather, the method
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
pense with the need to renegotiate the treaty or to supplement
it. ' This modern definition will aid governments in fighting new,
and as of yet, unknown criminal offenses.15 7
The revision should benefit government efforts to control the
movement of illegal drugs into the United States' 58 as well as im-
prove the effectiveness of international law enforcement efforts. 5
Because earlier treaties did not include drug smuggling, the United
States found it difficult to extradite and prosecute drug smug-
glers.1 60 With the new definition of an extraditable offense, the
United States will be able to prosecute drug traffickers and other
fugitives more effectively while avoiding the need to resort to ex-
traordinary apprehensions. Had there been such a provision in the
United States-Uruguayan extradition treaty"' in 1973, the out-
come of the Toscanino case probably would have been different.
United States officials would have been able to request extradition
rather than resorting to kidnapping.
2. Attempts and Conspiracies to Commit Extraditable
Offenses
The provision allowing extradition for attempts and conspiracies
to commit extraditable offenses is the second substantive improve-
ment in the 1984 extradition treaties. The addition of the conspir-
acy provision will close a significant loophole in traditional extradi-
tion practices by allowing the extradition of those who prepare,
aid, abet, or assist in the commission of an extraditable crime.'
Punishing conspiracy is important because:
collective criminal agreement presents a greater potential
threat to the public than individual acts. Concerted action both
increases the likelihood that the criminal objective will be suc-
defines an extraditable offense by its punishability under the laws of both nations by a
minimum standard of severity. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 134.
'" See S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, at 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, at
3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, at 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5, at 3.
'5 See SHEARER, supra note 7, at 132.
Bringing fugitive drug smugglers to justice will aid the effort to control drug traffick-
ing. Riding, Costa Rica Moves to Close Door to Fugitives, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1982, at 6,
col. 6.
159 Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 3.
0 See generally supra note 7 (drug trafficking not included as extraditable offense).
"'1 The treaty between the United States and Uruguay lists the crimes for which extradi-
tion is allowed. Drug trafficking is not included. Extradition Treaty, March 11, 1905, United
States-Uruguay, 35 Stat. 2028, T.S. No. 501.
"' See S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, at 3.
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cessfully attained and decreases the probability that the individu-
als involved will depart from their path of criminality. Group as-
sociation for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes
possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which
one criminal could accomplish.16 3
Organized criminal conspiracies are necessary to provide the
large amounts of cash and international connections required for
large, efficient, and successful trafficking operations." 4 The use of
a conspiracy theory, therefore, is the most effective legal tool for
the prosecution of organized crime because it permits the prosecu-
tion of members of the entire conspiracy rather than only those
who physically committed the crime.165 Prosecuting members of a
trafficking operation, such as the financiers, can help curb the flow
of drugs from producers to consumers, since cutting off financial
backing is essential to destroying drug trafficking operations. 166
3. Statute of Limitations
A third substantive difference between the 1984 extradition trea-
ties and their predecessors concerns the statute of limitations. The
older treaties denied extradition if either of the nations' statute of
limitations had expired.16 7 Impediments to extradition could occur
'6' Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE -
TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME 3-4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ORGANIZED CRIME].
165 The crime of conspiracy thus enables those with the criminal intent to be punished
even if their acts, standing alone, appear innocent. LAFAVE & SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 460
(1972).
'" See Review of Attorney General's Trip, supra note 31, at 5. Studies conducted by the
Drug Enforcement Administration have established that Hong Kong is the financial center
for Southeast Asian narcotics trafficking. Id. at 5. Prosecuting foreign financial conspirators
would prevent drug money from leaving Hong Kong and would disrupt drug trafficking op-
erations. Id. at 6.
167 The United States-United Kingdom (Jamaica) treaty of 1931 states that:
[T]he extradition shall not take place if, subsequently to the commission of the
crime or offense or the institution of the penal prosecution or the conviction
thereon, exemption from prosecution has been acquired by lapse of time, accord-
ing to the laws of the High Contracting Party applying to or applied to.
Extradition Treaty with United Kingdom, supra note 7, art. V. The original Costa Rican
and Thai treaties both state the same principle in a different manner:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered under the provisions thereof, when,
from lapse of time or other lawful cause, according to the laws of the place within
the jurisdiction of which the crime was committed, the criminal is exempt from
prosecution or punishment for the offense for which the surrender is asked.
Extradition Treaty, United States-United Kingdom, supra note 7, at art. V; Extradition
Treaty, United States-Siam, supra note 1, at art. V. A situation is conceivable where the
crime committed in the requested nation would also affect the requesting nation, thus, trig-
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because each nation's criminal statutes of limitations are not nec-
essarily the same length. India, for example, has no statute of limi-
tations regarding non-capital offenses. India instead applies a case-
by-case approach dependent upon the facts of each case.16 8 Non-
capital offenses in the United States, on the other hand, carry a
five-year limit.169
To avoid potential prescription problems, the new 1984 treaties
allow extradition unless the requesting nation's statute of limita-
tions has run. 70 The statute of limitations of the requested nation
thus becomes irrelevant. This substantive change will improve the
effectiveness of United States international law efforts and aid
United States efforts to combat international narcotics traffick-
ing' 7 ' because statute of limitation differences will not hamper ef-
forts to prosecute a criminal fugitive.
4. Extradition of Nationals
Another important substantive difference between the super-
seded treaties and the 1984 treaties regards the extradition of na-
tionals. Traditionally, a nation could either refuse to extradite its
own citizens altogether or use its discretion regarding extradi-
tion. 72 Although the former view is the more prevalant, 7 3 the
United States has opposed exempting nationals from extradi-
gering the statute of limitations provision. The situation is very feasible in the areas of
conspiracy and organized crime.
'" Jhirad v. Ferrandine, 355 F. Supp. 1155, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
169 18 U.S.C. § 3282; see also Jhirad, 355 F. Supp. at 1161.
170 All four 1984 extradition treaties declare that extradition shall not be granted when
the prosecution or the enforcement of the penalty for the offense for which extradition has
been sought has become barred by lapse of time pursuant to the laws of the requesting
state. S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, art. 7; S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, art.
6; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, art. 8; S. TREATY DOC. No. 20, supra note 5, art. 7.
'" See Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 3-4.
'7' See SHEARER, supra note 7, at 94.
Historically, there have been four major reasons used by nations that have refused to
extradite their own citizens. One of the older rationales is the "natural judges" theory.
Under this theory, the natural judges of a man were his neighbors, because they were likely
to be acquainted with the facts. See W. HOLDSWORTH, I A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 317 (7th
ed. 1956) for a thorough discussion of these theories. A second basis for refusal to extradite
is known as Treupflicht. German writers refer to this special duty as protection said to be
owed by the state to its subjects. A third reason often given for refusal to extradite is that a
citizen has the right to remain undisturbed in his homeland. The most practical rationale
for refusing to extradite a national is the fear that a foreigner will not receive the same
standard of justice in a foreign court as in his home court. See SHEARER, supra note 7, at
118-20 for a thorough discussion of the theories.
..S SHEARER, supra note 7, at 94.
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tion. 174 The texts of the superseded treaties did not bind either
party to extradite its nationals.'7 5 This language, in effect, gave a
nation the discretion to grant or to refuse a request for the extradi-
tion of one of its citizens.
The articles regarding nationals in the 1984 treaties, however,
are more stringent. With the exception of the Costa Rican agree-
ment, the treaties permit extradition if it is deemed appropriate.17 6
If extradition is denied, the treaties direct officials of the requested
nation to submit the case to the competent authorities for prosecu-
'" The United States Supreme Court stated that the word "persons" means the same as
"citizens" in extradition treaties. The Court also recognized that there is no rule of interna-
tional law exempting citizens from extradition unless such a provision appears in the treaty
text. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 467 (1913). See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 106, at VII,
3-1.
M The original United States-Siam treaty stipulated that "neither of the high con-
tracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens." Extradition Treaty with
Siam, supra note 7, art. 8, at 1011. The extradition treaty between the United States and
Costa Rica also stipulated that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver
up its own citizens or subjects." Extradition Treaty with Costa Rica, supra note 7, art. 8, at
1036. The treaty between the United States and Great Britain (Jamaica) stipulated that
"neither of the High Contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or
subjects." Extradition Treaty with Great Britain (Jamaica), supra note 7, art. 8, at 485. The
treaty between the United States and Italy is not as specific as the other extradition trea-
ties. The treaty states that both parties
agree to deliver up persons who, having been convicted of or charged with the
crimes specified in the following article, committed within the jurisdiction of one
of the contracting parties, shall seek an asylum or be found within the territories
of the other: Provided, that this shall only be done upon such evidence of crimi-
nality as, according to the laws of the place where the fugitive or person so
charged shall be found, would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial,
if the crime had been there committed.
Extradition Treaty with Italy, supra note 7, art. 1, at 629-30.
7"' The Extradition Treaty with Thailand states that "neither party shall be bound to
extradite its own nationals. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
Article, the Requested State shall, at the request of the Requesting State, submit the case to
its competent authority for prosecution." S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, art. 8, para.
(1)-(2), at 3. In the Jamaican treaty, "neither party shall be bound to deliver its own nation-
als, but may do so if it be deemed proper. If extradition is not granted, the Requested State
shall, if it has jurisdiction over the offense, submit the case to its highest authorities for
prosecution." S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 3, art. 7, para (1)-(3), at 3. The United
States-Italian treaty states that "a Requested Party shall not decline to extradite a person
because such a person is a national of the Requested Party." S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra
note 4, art. 4, at 2. Costa Rica is constitutionally barred from extraditing its nationals. The
Costa Rican treaty, therefore, states that:
Neither of the parties shall be bound to surrender its nationals. The Requested
State, however, shall have the power to grant extradition if, in its discretion, this
is deemed proper and provided the constitution of the requested state does not so
preclude. If the requested state refused, it shall, at the request of the requesting
state, submit the case to its competent authorities for prosecution.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 5, art. 5, para. (1)-(3), at 3.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
tion.177 These new treaty provisions make it more difficult for fugi-
tives to avoid extradition. Drug traffickers, previously immune
from prosecution because of their nationality, may now be brought
to justice. Allowing the extradition of nationals avoids the problem
of having to transport witnesses long distances at great expense
and inconvenience or providing evidence in the form of written af-
fidavits.178 The change thus aids the effectiveness and efficiency of
international extradition and international law enforcement
efforts.
5. Procedures, Documentation, and Evidence Requirements
The clarification of extradition procedures, documentation re-
quirements, and evidence requirements is the final substantive im-
provement in the 1984 extradition treaties. 179 The superseded trea-
ties did not specify the information required in extradition
documents.180 Because hearings were required before an extradi-
tion request was granted,181 delays occurred as a result of lack of
information. Delays often frustrated a nation's attempt to obtain
jurisdiction over a fugitive and ultimately led to abduction or ir-
regular rendition attempts.182 The texts of the 1984 treaties elimi-
nate and forestall such problems by explicitly listing the informa-
tion required in an extradition request.1 83
'7 S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 5, art. 5, para (1)-(3), at 3.
171 SHEARER, supra note 7, at 122-23.
179 Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 4.
1'" The Costa Rican treaty requires only that the requesting nation turn over a mandate
or preliminary warrant of arrest. Extradition Treaty with Costa Rica, supra note 7, art. XI,
para. 3. The treaty with Jamaica simply states that the requisition for surrender of a fugi-
tive shall be made to the Governor or chief authority. Extradition Treaty with Jamaica,
supra note 7, art. 15. The Thai treaty requires the request to be made by the respective
diplomatic agents. A mandate or preliminary warrant is also required. Extradition Treaty
with Siam (Thailand), supra note 7, art. XI.
11 Extradition Treaty with Costa Rica, supra note 7, art. XI; Extradition Treaty with
Siam (Thailand), supra note 7, art. XI; Extradition Treaty with Great Britain (Jamaica),
supra note 7, art. 15; Extradition Treaty with Italy, supra note 7, art. II.
18 See supra notes 121-39 and accompanying text.
183 The typical article dealing with extradition procedures and required documents is il-
lustrated by article 9 of the Extradition Treaty with Thailand:
Extradition Procedures and Required Documents
(1) The request for extradition shall be made through the diplomatic channel.
(2) The request for extradition shall be accompanied by:
(a) documents, statements, or other evidence which describe the identity and
probable location of the person sought;
(b) a statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and
location of the crime;
(c) the provisions of the law describing the essential elements and the designa-
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The evidence requirements necessary to allow extradition have
also been clarified to provide more efficient extradition procedures.
The superseded treaties allowed a warrant for the surrender of the
fugitive only if the evidence presented at the extradition hearing
was deemed sufficient to sustain the charge. i8 4 Whether the evi-
dence was sufficent was to be determined in the extradition hear-
ing.' The treaties provided no guidelines for an evidence stan-
dard."s6 To facilitate extradition, the new treaties apply a
"probable cause" test to determine whether the evidence supports
the extradition request." The "probable cause" test is easier to
establish than a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard which
could have been applied by requested nations under the older trea-
tion of the offense for which extradition is requested;
(d) the provisions of the law describing the punishment for the offense; and
(e) the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the prosecution or the
execution of punishment for the offense.
(3) A request for extradition relating to a person who is sought for prosecution also shall
be accompanied by:
(a) a copy of the warrant of arrest issued by a judge or other competent author-
ity of the Requesting State;
(b) such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would justify
that person's arrest and committal for trial, including evidence establishing that
the person sought is the person to whom the warrant of arrest refers.
(4) When the request for extradition relates to a convicted person, in addition to the
items required by paragraph (2) of this Article, it shall be accompanied by:
(a) a copy of the judgment of conviction by a court of the Requesting State; and
(b) evidence providing that the person sought is the person to whom the convic-
tion refers.
If the person has been convicted but not sentenced, the request for extradition
shall also be accompanied by a statement to that effect. If the convicted person
has been sentenced, the request for extradition shall also be accompanied by a
copy of the sentence imposed and a statement showing to what extent the sen-
tence has been carried out.
(5) All documents submitted by the Requesting State shall be translated into the lan-
guage of the Requested State.
(6) Documents transmitted through the diplomatic channel shall be admissible in extradi-
tion proceedings in the Requested State without further authentication, or other
legalization.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, at 9. See also S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, at
9; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, art. 8; S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5, art. 10.
'"' Extradition Treaty with Costa Rica, supra note 7, art. XI, para. 3; Extradition Treaty
with Jamaica, supra note 7, art. 9; Extradition Treaty with Siam, supra note 7, art. XI,
para. 5; Extradition Treaty with Italy, supra note 7, art. II.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, art. 9, para. 1; S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note
3, art. 9, para. 3; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, art. 9, para. 1; S. TREATY Doc. No. 20,
supra note 5, art. 10, para. 2.
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ties. A "probable cause" standard does not demand absolute cer-
tainty, but requires the existence of reasonable grounds for be-
lief.'8 8 Because this burden is relatively easy to meet, jurisdiction
over fugitives will be easier to obtain. By eliminating potential evi-
dentiary and delay problems, these new provisions will enhance
United States efforts to prosecute drug traffickers and improve the
effectiveness of international law enforcement.
B. Procedural Changes
Because extradition is a lengthy process, criminals are some-
times able to avoid arrest and prosecution.'89 To avoid this conse-
quence, the 1984 treaties have updated provisions permitting pro-
visional arrest in situations where the flight of the fugitive appears
imminent.9 0 Several older extradition treaties also addressed this
problem by allowing provisional arrest.' 9' The defect in the older
provisions, however, was that requests had to be made through
lengthy, traditional diplomatic channels.' 92 Fugitives, therefore,
still had time to avoid arrest. The 1984 treaties allow the extradi-
tion request to be made through traditional methods or directly
between the departments of justice of the two nations.' 3 The pro-
18 The Court in United States v. McGuire, 300 F. 98 (N.D.N.Y. 1924), stated the differ-
ence between "probable cause" and "beyond a reasonable doubt."
"Beyond a reasonable doubt" must include "probable cause." But "probable
cause" does not include or measure up to satisfaction "beyond a reasonable
doubt." They are widely different. "Beyond a reasonable doubt" may be likened
to a summit of a high mountain, and "probable cause" to a halfway station on the
mountain side. Few may reach the summit, but many may reach the halfway
station.
McGuire, 300 F. at 102.
199 SHEARER, supra note 7, at 200.
190 Statement of Mark Richard, supra note 6, at 5; See also S. TREATY Docs., supra notes
2-5.
191 The 1922 treaty with Thailand, for example, states that "in case of urgency, the appli-
cation for arrest and detention may be addressed directly to the competent magistrate in
conformity to the statute in force. Extradition Treaty with Siam, supra note 7, at art. XI,
para. 3.
199 SHEARER, supra note 7, at 201-02.
19 The Costa Rican agreement states:
In case of urgency, either Contracting Party may request the provisional deten-
tion of any charged or convicted person. Application for provisional detention
shall be made either through the diplomatic channel or directly between the De-
partment of Justice of the United States of America and the Ministerio de Jus-
ticia of the Republic of Costa Rica.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, at art. 11. The United States-Jamaican provision on
provisional arrest is as follows:
In case of urgency either Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest
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visional detention documents generally must contain: (1) informa-
tion identifying the person sought; (2) a brief statement of the
facts; (3) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest of a
judgment of conviction; and (4) a statement that a request for ex-
-tradition of the person sought will follow.' 9" Because this method is
quicker, it avoids the delays of the traditional extradition process.
Such provision also allows use of the communication facilities of
the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 9 5 to cir-
culate requests for arrest swiftly and effectively.19 By avoiding
traditional extradition procedures, provisional arrest allows greater
success in obtaining jurisdiction over fugitives. Thus, the efficiency
of international law enforcement efforts is greatly improved. The
speedy detention of fugitives will also aid United States efforts to
prosecute drug traffickers who may have been able to avoid arrest
under lengthy traditional procedures.
The Costa Rican and Italian treaties contain procedural im-
provements for the temporary surrender of fugitives serving
sentences in a requested country. 197 This provision, absent from
in accordance with the law of the Requested State of any accused or convicted
person pending the request for extradition. Application for provisional arrest shall
be made through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Department of
Justice in the United States of America and the Minister responsible for extradi-
tion in Jamaica.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, at art. 10.
The United States-Thailand provision states:
In case of urgency, either Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest
of any accused or convicted person. Application for provisional arrest shall be
made through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Department of Jus-
tice in the United States of America and the Ministry of Interior in Thailand, in
which case the communication facilities of Interpol may be used.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, at art. 10.
The United States-Italian treaty is as follows:
In case of urgency, either Contracting Party may apply for the provisional ar-
rests of any person charged or convicted of an extraditable offense. The applica-
tion for provisional arrest shall be made either through the diplomatic channel or
directly between the United States Department of Justice and the Italian Minis-
try of Grace and Justice, in which case the communication facilities of the Inter-
national Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) may be used.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5, at art. 7.
'9, See S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, at art. 10; S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note
3, at art. 11; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, at art. 12.
'95 Id. Interpol is a non-governmental international organization of national police forces.
The organization offers a liaison service to national policy authorities and coordinates police
inquiries among its members. SHEARER, supra note 7, at 202-03.
I" See generally SHEARER, supra note 7, at 202.
"97 The United States-Costa Rican treaty provision on temporary surrender states:
If the extradition request is granted in the case of a person who is serving in the
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older treaties, improves the effectiveness of United States interna-
tional extradition efforts by permitting the requesting nation to try
the person sooner while evidence and witnesses are more likely to
be available. 198 This increases the likelihood of a successful
prosecution. 199
Where the person is part of a conspiracy, the provision enables
the requesting nation to use the prisoner in the prosecution of
other participants. 00 Generally, everything said, done, or written
by one conspirator during the existence of the conspiracy and in
the execution or furtherance of a common purpose is admissible
evidence against the others .2 0 The prosecution of one member of a
drug trafficking operation, therefore, may be used to construct
cases against members not in legal custody.
A third procedural improvement establishes simplified extradi-
tion procedures when the person sought wishes to waive formal ex-
tradition.20 2 This new provision provides a mechanism for avoiding
territory of a Requested State for a different offense, the Requested State may
temporarily surrender the person sought to the Requesting State for the purpose
of prosecution. The person so surrendered shall be kept in custody while in the
Requesting State and shall be returned to the Requested State after the conclu-
sion of the proceedings against that person in accordance with conditions to be
determined by mutual agreement of the Contracting Parties.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, at art. 14.
The Italian treaty proclaims:
After a decision on a request for extradition has been rendered in the case of a
person who is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the Requesting
Party for a different offense, the Requested Party shall have the authority to tem-
porarily surrender the person sought to the Requesting Party solely for the pur-
pose of prosecution. A person so surrendered shall be kept in custody while the
Requesting Party at the conclusion of the proceedings against that person, in ac-
cordance with conditions to be determined by mutual agreement of the Con-
tracting Parties.
S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5, art. XIV.
198 Traditionally, a requested nation had the option to defer the surrender of the person
until all proceedings were concluded and/or all sentences served. See S. ExEc. REP. No. 30,
supra note 95, at art. 14.
9 Id. See also S. ExEc. REP. No. 33, supra note 95, at art. 1.
11 Id. S. ExEc. REP. No. 33, supra note 95, at art. 1.
$0' See United States v. Pellegrino, 273 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1960); Cooper v. United States,
256 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1958). This idea is premised upon the principles applicable to agen-
cies and partnerships that when a body of individuals assume the attributes of one associa-
tion, all should be bound by the acts of one of its members in carrying out the design.
Merrill v. United States, 40 F.2d 315, 316 (6th Cir. 1930). The extent to which such testi-
mony is admissible against others is within discretion of the court. Delaney v. United States,
263 U.S. 586 (1924).
202 S. TREATY Doc. No. 16, supra note 2, at art. 15; S. TREATY Doc. No. 17, supra note 3, at
art. 25; S. TREATY Doc. No. 18, supra note 4, at art. 18; S. TREATY Doc. No. 20, supra note 5,
at art. 17.
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the traditional time-consuming extradition request. Simplification
of an extradition request improves the effectiveness of United
States international legal efforts by avoiding the delays and costs
associated with traditional extradition procedures.0 3
IV. CONCLUSION
Broadening the scope of extraditable offenses, allowing extradi-
tion for attempts and conspiracies to commit extraditable offenses,
avoiding statute of limitation problems, permitting the surrender
of nationals, and clarifying and simplifying extradition procedures
will substantially improve outdated United States extradition pro-
cedures. Such substantive and procedural improvements to the ex-
tradition process should aid government efforts to fight narcotics
trafficking and to improve the effectiveness of the United States'
international law enforcement efforts.
The new treaties signed with Costa Rica, Jamaica, Thailand, and
Italy in 1984 should become part of a large program of interna-
tional cooperation in law enforcement aimed at combatting inter-
national narcotics trafficking. In recent years, although the United
States has increased monetary aid to drug-producing nations, the
volume of illicit drugs entering the United States continues to in-
crease. A successful program to fight drug trafficking requires effi-
cient international legal cooperation. These new treaties provide
the mechanism for such cooperation.
J. Richard Barnett
205 SHEARER, supra note 7, at 194.
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